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There is a large body of literature on the poor long-run stock performance of the typical 
initial public offering (IPO).  Academic research has observed that IPOs are poor long-run 
investments.  Considering this documented long-run underperformance of IPO firms, a debate 
still remains of whether the actual event of an equity issuance signals that a firm is overvalued at 
the time of IPO.  Specifically, this empirical study looks to discern whether a firm’s post-IPO 
performance is a result of an industry or firm-specific overvaluation at the time of IPO. 
 A firm may choose to time its IPO with the impetus that current investor sentiment has 
placed an unusually high valuation for the entire industry.  Conversely, if underperformance is 
not found to be an industry effect, then the theory of a firm-specific effect (as in, whether or not 
a firm times and performs an IPO) may be the condition to underperformance.  Investors 
understand that a firm’s executives undoubtedly have better information than the investor public.  
Therefore, a company’s decision to enter the public stock exchange market is made with the 
knowledge that this information asymmetry exists.  Hence, investors must question whether an 
IPO firm has timed its initial public offering to coincide with an unusually high firm valuation by 
the public – a valuation that the firm’s Management knows may not be substantiated in future 
earning years. 
 As later mentioned in the Literature Synopsis section, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and in 
part, Brav and Gompers (1997) identify that firms performing initial public offerings 
underperform in the long run.  If empirical evidence from this research project supports that 
underperformance is indeed a firm-specific effect, the event of an initial public offering would 
signal that a firm is overvalued.  In contrast, evidence may instead be indicative of investor over-
exuberance over a particular industry; and thus, this IPO effect is merely a side-effect of an 
industry downturn following investors’ overvaluation. 
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 To discern whether a firm’s post-IPO performance is due to an industry or firm 
overvaluation, a relevant benchmark must be chosen.  It is recognized that the measurement of 
long-term abnormal stock performance is sensitive to the benchmark utilized.  As detailed in the 
literature review in the following section, academics who have studied the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs have not agreed on the appropriate metrics and adjustments that ought 
to be used on a sample population.  In response, my research will attempt to bring forward some 
new evidence in regards to the link between the robustness of IPO underperformance and the 
estimation of overvaluation by isolating the sample population to the biotechnology sector.  A 
well-defined industry like biotechnology can eliminate the variable of market sentiment.  
Specifically, this study controls for unexpected industry-wide events which would equally affect 
the returns of the entire sample population.  Brav and Gompers (1997) cite that “matching firms 
to industry portfolios avoids the noise of selecting individual firms and can control for 
unexpected events that affect the returns of entire industries.” In their study, Brav and Gompers 
match firms to industry portfolios by utilizing the 49 industry portfolios created in Fama and 
French (1994) for one of their test of underperformance relative to different benchmarks.  By 
using the SIC codes of 2830-2836 and 8730-8734, I have a well-defined benchmark to adjust for 
industry and can thus test for various corporate finance behavior hypotheses.  The SIC codes 
chosen for this study match two of Fama and French’s industry portfolios1: (1) Pharmaceutical 
Products and (2) Research Development, and Testing labs. 
 In this article, I examine the robustness of IPO underperformance by using several 
benchmarks and methodologies, which are similar to the Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav 
and Gompers (1997) papers.  However, as an addendum to these two previous papers, I make the 
adjustment for industry, by utilizing biotechnology portfolios of issuers and non-issuers.  The 
                                                 
1
 Defined by SIC codes also. 
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first test examines the long-term performance of individual firms that performed an IPO between 
the years of 1980 and 1997, and therefore employs a time period that extends to 2002.  The 
second procedure investigates the long-run returns and wealth relatives of Initial Public Offering 
Portfolios in comparison to various benchmarks.  The third test examines long-run performance 
of IPOs by Cohort Year.  Lastly, the fourth method emphasizes the Fama-French three-factor 
time-series regressions on monthly returns for portfolios of issuing and non-issuing firms.  In an 
ideal empirical research project, each of these four varied tests would confirm the results from 
the other three.  However, as one will see in this article, the analysis from each of these tests 
yields some-what conflicting results, but in aggregate more fully depicts the population and 
provides answers to the question posed in this research.   
 Based on the empirical evidence from the biotechnology industry, I find that 
underperformance is not a firm specific effect.   After adjustments for risk, size, and industry 
have been undertaken, IPOs do not underperform relative to the benchmark – the biotechnology 
industry.  When size-matched Fama-French regressions are utilized, small Biotech issuers and 
non-issuers perform poorly relative to the explicit market pricing model.  However, when 
adjustments for industry are undertaken, small issuers do not underperform.  This is in addenum 
to the Brav and Gompers study, which found that underperformance is characteristic of small, 
low book-to-market non-VC backed companies, regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not.  
This result may be also indicative of a partial industry effect.  Small firms within the 
biotechnology industry may time their initial public offerings to coincide with an industry 
overvaluation, as small non-issuers perform even more poorly than small issuers in the same 
industry. 
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 This paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews previous research papers that are 
most relevant to this article.  Section II describes the data.  Section III presents evidence on the 
long-run performance of Biotechnology firms who had issued an initial public offering from 
January 1980 to December 1997 {utilizing stock return data from December 1979 to December 
2002}.  Section IV addresses some analyses and possible explanations of the results. 
 
Section I. Literature Synopsis 
In a frequently cited study, Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter (1995) discuss the poor long-run 
performance of IPOs from 1970 to 1990.  They state that the geometric five-year average annual 
return of a firm which issued an initial public offering was 5% versus a size-matched non-issuing 
firm’s 12% average annual return. In other words, to be left with the same wealth five years later, 
forty-four percent more money would need to be invested in issuers than in nonissuers. Brav and 
Gompers (1997) also investigate the long-run underperformance of IPOs, but distinguish venture 
backed IPOs from non-venture backed companies. They find evidence that venture backed IPOs 
do not underperform, and reason that the negative IPO Effect that Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
discuss was instead a characteristic of small, non-venture backed IPO firms. Specifically, the 
researchers describe that over five years, venture backed IPOs earn 44.6% on average, while 
nonventure-backed IPOs earn 22.5% in returns.  In addition, Brav and Gompers posit that stock 
underperformance is an attribute of small, low book-to-market companies, regardless of whether 
they are IPO firms or not.  The researchers relied on a combined metric of size and book-to-
market as a benchmark to measure IPO performance, because they believe that a sized matched 
firm adjustment (as completed by Loughran and Ritter) ignores evidence that book-to-market cap 
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is related to returns.  On the other hand, Loughran and Ritter state that only a modest portion of 
IPO firms’ underperformance can be linked to book-to-market effects. 
In relation to the appropriate benchmarks used to match the performance of IPO firms, 
Brav and Gompers replicated Loughran and Ritters’ use of the four broad market indexes.  
However, the former also compared the performance of IPOs to industry portfolios, while 
Loughran and Ritter did not match by industry.   
As a corollary to their main focus on IPO underperformance, both papers bring forth 
evidence of the positive relationship between high issuance volume years and severe 
underperformance in returns.  However, Brav and Gompers point out that event time results may 
be misleading about the pervasiveness of underperformance, as returns of recent IPO firms may 
be correlated.  They cite some initial evidence in support of the correlation between the returns 
of IPO firms and calendar time.  Loughran and Ritter also suggest a market in which firms issue 
equity during transitory windows of opportunity when they are substantially overvalued. Jain and 
Kini (1994) echo the same sentiments and note that entrepreneurs time their IPOs to coincide 
with unusually good financial results, which may not be sustainable in the future.   
 
Section II. Data 
 The biotechnology industry portfolio used in this study is defined by Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes: 2830 – 2836 and 8730 – 8734.  These two industrial groups include 
Pharmaceutical Preparations, Diagnostic Substances, Biological Products, and Research, 
Development, And Testing Services.  As aforementioned, these two groups of SIC codes also 
encompass two of Fama and French’s industry portfolios: “Pharmaceutical Products” and 
“Research, Development, and Testing labs”. 
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 The biotechnology industry was selected as the area for study because it is a sector that 
frequently utilizes the public equity markets.  Biotechnology companies derive value from the 
discovery and development of new drugs and compounds, which is expensive.  It has been 
documented that a typical drug costs approximately $800 million over ten years to bring from 
development to the market.  Hence, IPO activity may be a substitute for additional venture 
capital financing and the sector’s utilization of equity issuances is partly due to the capital 
intensive nature of the sector.  With these basic characteristics, the biotechnology industry 
provides a very relevant benchmark and a good initial pick for an industry study. 
 Within this defined industry population, a sample of 633 operating companies that had 
gone public in the United States from January 1980 to December 1997 was analyzed for this 
article.  However, returns data was taken up to December 2002 to provide a full five years for 
those firms who performed IPOs in 1997.  These stock data returns are listed on the University of 
Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Nasdaq or American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) daily tapes.  Therefore, to be included in this 
sample, a firm carrying out an initial public offering must be followed by CRSP at some point 
after the offering date. 
 On December 31, 1979, there were forty-nine firms in the biotech portfolio.  The number 
of companies within the population grew to 415 on December 31, 2002.  However, with the 
knowledge that almost twice as many companies have become publicly listed during this time 
period, this supports the intuition that the number of companies that have listed and delisted 
within this population is high. 
 The long-run performance of new issues is measured over a five-year or sixty months 
interval.  The choice of time study is consistent with the Brav and Gompers and Loughran and 
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Ritter studies.  The five year time interval was chosen, because the longer the time interval, the 
greater the total underperformance, although the greater the variability of returns expected.  In 
addition, Loughran (1993) states that IPOs underperform for approximately five years. 
 
Section III. Evidence 
A) Average Five-Year Returns for Individual New Issuers from 1980 to 1997. 
 
 The majority of this paper utilizes portfolio returns to investigate any underperformance 
of IPOs.  However, this section provides some introductory evidence on the individual long-term 
performance of biotechnology IPOs from 1980 to 2002.  As seen in Table I, 56.4% of these 
biotechnology issuers had negative returns over the first five years after their CRSP initial listing 
(or the last CRSP listed price).  However, the mean five-year return is 41.1% and the median is -
18.4%.  This deviation between mean and median returns is due to the extremes on the positive 
returns end, where 20% of the population from 1980 to 2002 had greater than 110% in buy-and-
hold returns over five years.  In addition, the 40% of IPOs which performed below -70% within 
five years can be attributed to the difficulties in remaining as a publicly listed company.  As seen 
in this two-axes graph (Figure I), the histogram is positively skewed, which indicates the 
presence of a small proportion of relatively large extreme values.  In addition, the variance of 
buy-and-hold returns is large, at 356(%)2. 
 It is easy to comprehend that investing in any one of these individual IPO firms which 
had a negative five-year buy-and-hold return would not be an optimal investment choice.  
However, one cannot properly interpret the remaining 44% of the biotechnology industry sample 
population which had positive returns over five years, without the comparison of an appropriate 
benchmark.  For example, it would be unwise for an investor, who was basing her investment 
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decisions solely on the historical performance of a stock, to pick a firm that had a positive 10% 
buy-and-hold return over five years when the entire industry returned 30%. 
 The previously noted characteristics of the histogram and oglive (the cumulative relative 
frequency plot) signal that an examination of only individual IPO firm returns can be misleading 
to investors.  The variability of returns within this 633 large IPO population highlights the need 
for the use of portfolios, rather than individual firms in a data-based academic study.  Single 
company returns do not have a normal distribution (or bell-shaped histogram), as seen in Figure 
I.  Hence, the construction of useful tests and statistics that describe this particular data set would 
be difficult and unreliable if this normal distribution requirement is not achieved.  In addition, 
analysis on individual issuers alone would be misleading because returns of issuing firms are 
correlated with each other. 
 Thus, by studying portfolio returns on this population, I can examine the co variances of 
issuing firms’ returns and properly analyze statistics of the population.  IPO portfolios are used 
in the analysis of firm underperformance in the remainder of this paper.  Also, in order to 
interpret and understand the relative magnitude of IPO long-run stock performance returns, a 
benchmark is used for comparison. 
 
 
 B) Five-Year Post-Initial Public Offering (IPO) Returns and Wealth Relatives versus Various 
Benchmarks 
 
 Brav and Gompers (1997) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) utilize several benchmarks to 
investigate the negative IPO effect.  This study extends their analyses by using a well-defined 
benchmark, the biotechnology industry.  The biotechnology industry population, as defined in 
the preceding section, is used in the equal and value-weighted portfolio studies.   In the equal-
weighted portfolio, one calculates the monthly return on a portfolio that buys equal amounts of 
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all IPO firms.  In respect to the value weighted portfolio, one invests an amount that is 
proportional to the market value of each IPO firm’s equity in the previous month.  Value-
weighted portfolios of IPO firms’ returns and the relative benchmarks are utilized because they 
demonstrate how IPO underperformance can affect an investor’s wealth. The Biotech benchmark 
portfolio excludes any IPO firms’ returns that had gone public within the previous five years.  
Similar to the two previously cited studies, the performance of initial public offering firms is also 
compared to the S&P500, Nasdaq Composite, and NYSE/AMEX (includes dividends).  
However, IPO firms are not eliminated from these three broad market indices. 
 Table II presents the average long-run (as defined by five years) buy-and-hold 
performance for IPO and benchmark portfolios based on holding either an equal or value-
weighted portfolio.  These average five-year buy-and-hold returns are calculated assuming 
monthly portfolio rebalancing.  CRSP monthly tapes are used for the earlier of 60 months or the 
delisting dates.  Five-year buy-and-hold returns are compounded monthly and are based on 
holding an IPO portfolio which contains all biotechnology IPOs that had gone public in the 
previous 60 months for five years. The wealth relative measure is computed by dividing the 
average terminal value from investing $1 in each issuing firm with the average terminal value 
from investing $1 in the relevant benchmark.  Wealth relatives less than one signify that the IPO 
portfolio has underperformed relative to its benchmark. 
 As seen in Table II, the difference between the mean and median five-year average buy-
and-hold returns of the equal and value-weighted IPO portfolios indicates that IPO returns within 
this industry are highly skewed and have a large standard deviation.  The positive skewness and 
variance of the equal and value weighted portfolios are in line with the similar descriptive 
statistics as the individual IPO returns in the previous section.  The mean five-year buy-and-hold 
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return of 158% for the equal-weighted IPO portfolio is considerably greater than the comparable 
percentage return for the value-weighted portfolio of 24%.  Relying on this evidence alone 
would signal that IPO firms that have had higher returns are those with lower market values, 
which are not weighted as heavily in a value weighted portfolio (this assumption is adjusted in 
the later Fama French analysis).  The equal weighted and value-weighted industry portfolios 
have similar long-term return performance.  The equal-weighted IPO portfolio slightly 
underperforms relative to this industry benchmark, while the significantly lower return of the 
value-weighted portfolio underperforms strongly with a wealth relative of .46.   
 The most suitable benchmark used to compare IPO portfolio returns is the 
aforementioned biotechnology industry portfolio, which excludes all issuing firms within the 
previous 60 months.  Comparing the IPO portfolios to the broad market indexes like the 
S&P500, Nasdaq, and NYSE/AMEX is misleading.  The five-year wealth relatives for the equal-
weighted portfolio for each of these broad market indexes are greater than one, and range from 
1.16 to 1.36.  Wealth relatives greater than one signal that issuing firms on average, 
outperformed these three broad market indexes over five years.  This would mislead investors to 
believe that a biotechnology IPO portfolio is a wise investment, while in reality IPOs are 
underperforming relative to the industry benchmark (based on this empirical test’s results).  
However, the IPO value weighted portfolio’s wealth relatives using the broad market indices as 
benchmarks still yields results below 1, which signals underperformance.  This is consistent with 
the value-weighted IPOs to industry benchmark wealth relative analysis. 
 As with all empirical tests, some caveats must be weighed.  Comparing the buy-and-hold 
returns of issuers’ and non-issuers’ portfolios implicitly assumes that the two portfolios to have 
the same betas and risk-loading.  IPO portfolios, the biotechnology industry, and most definitely 
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the broad market indices all have different risks which have not been adjusted for within this 
empirical test which utilizes wealth relatives. 
 
 
C) The Long-Run Performance of IPOs by Cohort Year. 
 As an extension of the previous section analyzing the average buy-and-hold returns of 
IPO portfolios, this performance test (Table III) examines returns on the basis of different cohort 
years.  For firms which had performed an IPO between the years of 1980 and 1997, buy-and-
hold returns and wealth relatives are reported on a cohort year-by-year basis.  The benchmark 
used for comparison is solely the biotechnology industry portfolio, which excludes all firms that 
had performed an IPO in the previous five years.  IPO equal and value-weighted portfolios are 
used once again for this set of tests.   
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) write that the years of greatest 
IPO activity are associated with the most underperformance.  As seen in Table III and Figure II, 
there does not seem to be the same correlation in the biotechnology industry population.  
Visually, there does not seem to be any relationship between the volume of issuances in a 
particular year and the performance of an IPO portfolio relative to its industry. 
 In each of the cohort years, from 1980 to 1997, the five-year buy-and-hold return for the 
equal-weighted IPO portfolio is considerably greater than the comparable percentage return for 
the value-weighted portfolio.  Hence, the yearly cohort results suggest that when returns are 
value-weighted, the underperformance effect is heightened.  As noted in the previous analyses, 
this signals that IPO firms with higher returns are those with lower market values, which are not 
weighted as heavily in a value weighted portfolio.  Additionally, when the yearly cohort returns 
are value weighted, the portfolio wealth relative through time becomes more uniform.  The 
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spikes in the equal-weighted portfolio wealth relative in cohort years 1981, 1986, and 1993 are 
minimized in the value-weighted portfolio.  The value-weighted IPO portfolio only outperforms 
the industry benchmark in 1986, while the equal-weighted IPO portfolio has wealth relatives 
greater than one in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1995. 
 Despite the previously noted six years of IPO over-performance relative to the industry 
benchmark, an investor who invests in the IPO portfolio for five years based on the firms at year 
t, will on average earn a return that is less than a return that would have been earned by investing 
in the biotechnology industry portfolio (excluding IPOs).  Analysis of cohort year IPO 
performance supports the previous finding of a long-run IPO underperformance relative to the 
industry benchmark. 
 The cohort year test which was analyzed in the preceding two paragraphs are held to the 
same caveats as the buy-and-hold returns and wealth relatives versus several benchmarks test in 
the previous section.  The portfolios formed in this round of tests are again not adjusted for betas 
and risk-loading.  Hence, one must be cautious in comparing IPO portfolio returns to non-issuers 
and then drawing final conclusions.  Adjustments for such risks are undertaken in the time series 
regressions tests of this research paper. 
 
 D) Three-Factor Time-Series Regressions – Full Sample and Size Matched 
 In Tables IV and V, I report the results of time-series regressions of monthly portfolio 
returns on Fama French three factors. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1993) used these three 
factors to explain excess returns on stock portfolios.  In their study, they show that these three 
stock market variables (MKTRF, SMB, HML) describe a statistically significant portion of stock 
returns variation.  One disadvantage of this test is that to the degree that the portfolio is 
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correlated with omitted factors, the intercepts can embody factors other than what is explicitly 
controlled for. 
 The sample is all Biotechnology IPOs from January 1980 to December 2002.  Portfolios 
of IPOs include all firms which performed an initial public offering within the previous five 
years.  In other words, the IPO portfolio is a five-year rolling portfolio.  The regressions which 
follow are based on the following Fama-French Three-Factor Equation: 
Rp,t –Rf,t = a + b[Rm,t – Rf,t] + sSMBt + hHMLt + et 
In the regression equations, Rp,t is the return on the respective portfolio, whether it is the running 
IPO portfolio or the non-issuers benchmark portfolio.  These benchmark factors represent (1) the 
overall market return (Rm), (2) the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (SMB, 
Small Minus Big), and (3) the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (HML, High 
Minus Low)2.  Specifically, Rm,t is the return on the value –weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and 
Nasdaq stocks in month t; Rf,t is the beginning-of-month one-month Treasury Bill rate in month 
t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the 
return on high book-to-market (value) stocks minus low book-to-market (growth) stocks in 
month t. 
 This paper focuses on the regressions based on the dependent variable of the industry 
adjusted excess portfolio return, or the difference between the running IPO portfolio and the 
respective non-issuing firms portfolio within the Biotechnology population.  One expects the 
difference of the two regressions: 1) [Issuers - One month T-bill] minus 2) [Non-issuers 
benchmark - the One month T-bill] to be equal to the coefficient of the industry adjusted excess 
portfolio returns: [Issuers – Non-issuers benchmark].   
                                                 
2
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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 The first set of the Fama-French three factor regressions is completed on the full IPO 
portfolio sample.  The second set of three factor regressions uses an IPO portfolio sorted on the 
size of the firm. 
 
Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Regression on Full Sample Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
Portfolios 
 
 Table IV presents the Fama-French three-factor time series results for the Full-Sample.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) explain that if the poor performance of issuing firms is simply a 
manifestation of compounding effects - such as differences in size, book-to-market ratios, and 
betas - then the intercepts in the regressions should be equal to zero.  Lines (3) and (6) represent 
the excess return between the issuers and non-issuers portfolio.  Utilizing an equally-weighted 
portfolio, issuing firms seem to outperform non-issuing firms by 14.5 basis points per month, or 
1.74% over one year.  However, this point estimate is not statistically significant with a t-statistic 
of 0.56.  The value weighted portfolio yields a slightly negative, but weak intercept coefficient of 
-.00023.  The implied t-statistic is -.07, which indicates that this coefficient result is statistically 
insignificant.  If the coefficient had been statistically significant, the IPO portfolio would seem to 
underperform the non-issuers portfolio only by .276% over one year and a severe IPO 
underperformance effect is not found. 
 If the intercept coefficients of the equally-weighted portfolio are compared to the value-
weighted portfolio, the value weighted intercept coefficients are less than the equally-weighted 
intercept coefficients for both issuers and non-issuers.  This result suggests that the largest 
market capped firms may not have performed as well as smaller market cap firms did, which is 
the conclusion that was reached in the five year buy-and-hold returns in Tests B and C.  
However, this inference is not completely sound, as indicated by the regression analysis on large 
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and small firms which follows.  As later noted in this article, large issuers and non-issuers 
outperform small issuers and non-issuers relative to the three-factor asset pricing model. The 
relatively smaller intercept coefficients for the value-weighted portfolio versus the equal-
weighted portfolio are representative of the fact that the majority of the population is made up of 
small firms (as described by the SMB coefficient analyzed in the following paragraphs).   Hence, 
in this study, the value-weighted portfolio places greater weight on a smaller portion of the 
population, but the number of small firms with poor returns still depresses returns due to the 
sheer number of small issuers. 
 The b coefficient in the regressions represents MKTRF: the excess return on the market.  
As seen by the higher b coefficient for issuers versus non-issuers (within both the equally-
weighted and value-weighted regressions), issuers have betas which are larger than non-issuers.  
Hence, if we assume that beta risk is taken into account in the price of a security, issuers should 
have higher returns than non-issuers. 
 Both issuers and non-issuers in the equal and value weighted portfolios have negative 
HML coefficients h.  This indicates that their returns covary with the returns of growth (low 
book-to-market) firms.  As the h coefficients for the IPO equal and value portfolios are more 
negative than the non-issuers’ benchmark portfolio, this indicates that the returns on IPO tend to 
covary more with the returns of growth companies. 
 The large positive loading coefficients on SMB indicate that issuers covary with small 
firms, and to a higher degree than their non-issuing counterparts.  Interestingly, there is a 
statistically significant negative coefficient on the value weighted non-issuers.  This may be 
explained, as the value weighted portfolio places more weight on large market capped stocks, so 
thus these non-issuer returns covary with large firms. 
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 Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Regression on Size Sorted Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
Portfolios 
 
 Table V presents the Fama-French three factor regression results after dividing the 
sample by size.  Large firms are those whose market capitalization at time t is greater than the 
median firm in the biotechnology sample population.  Conversely, Small firms are those whose 
market capitalization is smaller than the median firm within the sample population at that time 
period. 
 Lines (3), (6), (9), and (12) represent the excess return between the issuers and non-
issuers portfolio.  Utilizing equally-weighted portfolios, large issuing firms considerably 
outperformed large non-issuers by 78.7 basis points per month, with a significant t-statistic of 
2.74.   Smaller issuers do not perform as badly as non-issuing firms in the equally-weighted 
portfolio, as there is a positive excess return intercept of .00173.   However, this result is not 
significant with a .52 t-statistic.  When returns are value-weighted, large issuers have an almost 
indistinguishable to zero intercept coefficient of -.00006, which economically is equal to zero.  
The result is not statistically significant with a t-statistic of -.01.  Similar to the equally-weighted 
portfolio, small issuers’ value-weighted returns are not as poor as small non-issuers.  The 
associated coefficient for the excess return’s intercept is 11.1 bps, but it is not statistically 
significant. 
 Brav and Gompers (1997) write that if IPOs underperform on a risk-adjusted basis, 
portfolios of IPOs should consistently underperform relative to an explicit asset pricing model, 
such as the Fama French three-factor model.  Hence, the intercept from time series regressions is 
used as an indicator of risk-adjusted performance.  For both equal and value weighted portfolios, 
large issuers and non-issuers have positive and statistically significant intercepts, which indicate 
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over performance relative to this asset pricing model.  On the other hand, both small issuers and 
non-issuers have negative intercepts, which indicate underperformance to the Fama French asset 
pricing model.  Yet, when IPO firms of both size quintiles are compared to their non-issuer 
benchmark (in both the equal and value weighted portfolios and large and small market capped 
firms’ returns), they do not underperform relative to this industry adjusted benchmark. 
 The coefficients on HML are negative for all portfolios in the time series regressions – 
both large and small equal and value weighted portfolios.  In the equal weighted portfolio, the 
larger the firm, the more it co varies with low book-to-market firms.  As Brav and Gompers cite, 
large firms (in market value) will have low book-to-market ratios and hence covary with growth 
companies.  Also of note, issuing firms load more negatively than non-issuing firms, indicating 
that issuing firms have characteristics of growth companies.  This pattern is not as clear utilizing 
the value-weighted portfolio, as the coefficients on HML for large issuers, small issuers, and 
small non-issuers are not statistically significant. 
  The b coefficients in the regressions for equally-weighted Large Issuers and Small 
Issuers and value-weighted Small Issuers are greater than the betas for non-issuers.   This finding 
is consistent with the issuer versus non-issuer betas in the full-sample.  Issuers with their higher 
betas are expected to have higher returns than non-issuers, if beta risk is priced – which is also 
demonstrated by the associated positive intercept coefficients (in lines 3, 6, 9 and 12 of Table V).  
Contrary to expectations, the beta of large issuers within the value-weighted portfolio is 
significantly smaller than the beta for large non-issuers.  In parallel, the return for large issuers is 
slightly less than large non-issuers in the value-weighted portfolio. The difference in betas 
between the equal and value-weighted portfolio signifies that the largest market capped IPO 
firms in the biotechnology industry sample have low co variability of return with the market 
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return, while those large firms closer to the industry median market cap have betas above or 
close to 1. 
 The coefficients on SMB are as expected, given the information on the HML coefficients.  
In the equal weighted portfolio, both large and small issuers covary with small firms, and to a 
degree that is greater than their respective non-issuers.  Small issuers in the value-weighted 
portfolio also covary more with small firms than its respective small non-issuers.  Large issuers 
in the value-weighted portfolio have a slightly negative SMB coefficient, but not statistically 
significant.  In respect to large non-issuers in the value-weighted portfolio, these large issuers 
seem to be smaller in respect. 
 
Section IV. Evaluation: 
 The coefficients from the three-factor regressions in the two analyses above can be used 
to describe the biotechnology population.   Issuers have more positive and higher betas (or 
excess returns to the market) than non-issuers in the biotechnology population.  While both 
issuers and non-issuers are growth (low book-to-market) firms, companies that perform an IPO 
are relatively more growth oriented firms in comparison to the benchmark.  As per intuition, 
issuing firms are smaller in market capitalization than non-issuers. 
 In both the full sample and size differentiated regressions that were run using the Fama 
French three factor model, IPO underperformance relative to the industry benchmark is not 
substantiated.  In the full-sample time series regressions, the equal weighted portfolio’s 
intercepts do not indicate IPO underperformance relative to the three-factor pricing model and in 
comparison to the industry benchmark.  It is only in the value-weighted portfolio that IPOs 
slightly underperform by 2.3 basis points per month relative to the industry benchmark – but this 
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point estimate is not statistically significant.  The second time-series regressions divide the issuer 
and non-issuer population into large and small divisions, based on market capitalization.  The 
equal and value-weighted small issuers’ regressions have similar intercept coefficients, where 
these small issuers and non-issuers both show underperformance relative to the explicit pricing 
model, but a positive industry adjusted excess return.   
 Examining small issuers in the value-weighted portfolio finds a statistically significant 
underperformance of 212.6 basis points per month, relative to the Fama French explicit pricing 
model.  However, the robustness of this IPO underperformance effect is minimized in 
comparison to small non-issuers within the industry portfolio, which underperformed relative to 
the asset pricing model by 223.6 basis points.  The industry adjusted excess return of issuers 
minus non-issuers actually has an over-performance of 11.1 basis points per month (with a t-
statistic of 0.37).  This conclusion supports the theory that stock underperformance by small 
firms is not a firm-specific effect.  Instead, small biotech firms may time their initial public 
offerings to coincide with an industry overvaluation, as small non-issuers are seen to perform 
even more poorly than small issuers.   
 These remarks refine Brav’s and Gompers’ (1997) conclusions.  As noted earlier in this 
article, Brav and Gompers observe that stock underperformance is attributed to small, low book-
to-market companies, regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not.  In this study, I find that 
with an industry adjustment, small IPO firms actually do not underperform.  In addition, as seen 
in the coefficients of HML in the Fama French regressions, the biotechnology industry co varies 
strongly with low book-to-market firms, and hence my small firm portfolio is similar to Brav’s 
and Gompers’ small, low book-to-market portfolio with an industry adjustment. 
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 The underperformance of issuing companies relative to the industry benchmark in the 
buy-and-hold analysis in Table II cannot be directly compared to the Fama French regression 
analysis.  The comparison of buy-and-hold returns of issuers relative to non-issuers, as calculated 
through the Wealth Relative ratio is a forced and unnatural evaluation.  Comparing the buy-and-
hold returns of issuers’ and non-issuers’ portfolios implicitly assumes that the two portfolios to 
have the same betas and risk-loading, although they undoubtedly have different risks.  The 
Fama-French three factors take care of the risk-loading differences between issuers and non-
issuers, and thus allows for an investigation of returns underperformance.  In addition, academic 
research has shown that as variance of returns increases, the buy-and-hold return decreases. As 
noted earlier, the variance in returns of the issuing firms’ portfolio is high and hence, results are 
biased toward to a lower buy-and-hold return relative to a less variable non-issuing portfolio. 
 As noted in the above analyses, underperformance of returns relative to the overall 
market is only found in the returns of small biotechnology issuers and non-issuers.  However, 
when industry has been adjusted for, any IPO underperformance effect is negated. Regressions 
of IPO and non-issuing firms’ returns on the Fama French three factors do not support the theory 
of firm specific misevaluation, since IPOs do not underperform relative to the industry adjusted 
benchmark.  Similar to the Brav and Gompers (1997) study, this article shows that the 
underperformance documented by Loughran and Ritter (1995) is not characteristic of all IPO 
firms.  Large issuers are seen to outperform large non-issuers in the same industry, while small 
issuers perform as poorly as small non-issuers relative to the market pricing model.  This result 
again reaffirms the need to examine the specific characteristics of firms that underperform in the 
long-run. 
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 Brav and Gompers (1995) detail several reasons why small, low book-to-market firms 
appear to underperform.  These reasons may also be relevant in this industry adjusted study.  
Brav and Gompers write that investor sentiment may have an impact on the performance of 
small, low book-to-market firms as these firms are more liable to be subject to fads and investor 
sentiment.  With the relatively small size of these firms, they are also more likely to be held by 
individuals.  Additionally, the aforementioned problem of information asymmetry is particularly 
predominant between small firms and their investors because institutional research analysts are 
less likely to cover these firms.  Likewise, individual investors are unable to spend as much time 
tracking the returns of their investment decisions.  Lastly, Brav and Gompers theorize that 
individuals who are most likely to invest in small IPO companies are those who view such an 
investment like a lottery ticket.  If an investor’s utility is derived from a bet as such, his 
investment decisions will not appear perfectly rational. 
 However, there may be additional real factors which can explain the underperformance of 
small firms within this industry in respect to the overall market.  This study should be replicated 
using another industry portfolio, such as technology, in order to verify the results of this study.  
Since most firms in the biotechnology portfolio are growth (small book-to-market) firms, another 
industry with a greater variety of book-to-market ratios can be used to discern if a firm’s book-
to-market ratio is also an indicator of underperformance. 
 In response to the question initially posed in the beginning of this article, “Does an equity 
issuance serve as a signal for overvaluation?”: Long-run return underperformance is indeed not 
a firm specific effect (as signaled by an IPO), based on evidence from the Biotechnology 
industry from 1980 to 2002.  In addendum to the Brav and Gompers (1997) study, small firms do 
not underperform when an industry adjustment is completed.  In addition, a partial industry 
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effect at the time of IPO is also supported, as small firms within the biotechnology industry may 
time their initial public offerings to coincide with an industry overvaluation. 
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Table I.  Average Five-Year Returns for Firms Performing Initial Public Offerings from 
1980 to 1997. 
 
The IPO sample comes from the biotechnology industry population from 1980 through 2002.  IPOs are identified by 
an initial CRSP listing during this time period.  The average five-year returns for individual firms that performed an 
IPO between 1980 and 1997 are calculated below.  It is a monthly compounded percentage return over the earlier of 
60 months or the last CRSP listed return.  In total, 633 IPO firms were used in the calculation.  Five-year buy-and-
hold returns are first listed, followed by the number of firms within that category, and finally the cumulative number 



























-100 0 .0% 80 7 74.6% 260 1 91.6%
-90 59 9.3% 90 10 76.1% 270 1 91.8%
-80 51 17.4% 100 12 78.0% 280 4 92.4%
-70 44 24.3% 110 8 79.3% 290 2 92.7%
-60 51 32.4% 120 12 81.2% 300 2 93.0%
-50 29 37.0% 130 8 82.5% 310 1 93.2%
-40 25 40.9% 140 8 83.7% 320 1 93.4%
-30 27 45.2% 150 5 84.5% 330 2 93.7%
-20 27 49.4% 160 7 85.6% 340 1 93.8%
-10 25 53.4% 170 7 86.7% 350 0 93.8%
0 19 56.4% 180 3 87.2% 360 2 94.2%
10 19 59.4% 190 3 87.7% 370 1 94.3%
20 20 62.6% 200 6 88.6% 380 1 94.5%
30 18 65.4% 210 4 89.3% 390 0 94.5%
40 22 68.9% 220 2 89.6% 400 0 94.5%
50 12 70.8% 230 1 89.7% More 35 100.0%
60 10 72.4% 240 5 90.5%
70 7 73.5% 250 6 91.5%
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Table II. Five-Year Post-Initial Public Offering (IPO) Returns and Wealth Relatives 
Versus Various Benchmarks 
 
The biotechnology sample includes returns from 1980 through 2002.  The benchmarks used also utilize returns from 
the same time period.  The average five-year buy-and-hold portfolio return of IPO portfolios is compared to seven 
benchmarks.  Both an equal weighted and value weighted portfolio are created, each containing returns up to sixty 
months from an IPO’s initial CRSP listing.  The average five-year buy-and-hold portfolio returns are a monthly 
compounded percentage return over 60 months (for all IPOs that went public from 1980 to 1997). This is akin to 
buying a portfolio of all of the IPOs that had gone public in year t and holding the portfolio for five years.  The 
wealth relatives for the five-year period after IPO is the ratio of one plus the IPO portfolio return over one plus the 
return on the chosen benchmark.  The Biotech Industry Portfolio Benchmark contains all firms within the described 
industry population, but removes all returns from IPO firms within five years of the CRSP initial listing date.  EW 
signifies equally weighted and VW signifies value-weighted portfolios.  The Average Buy-and-Hold Returns 
presented in Table II are percentage returns.  For example, the average five-year buy-and-hold return for the equal-















Biotech Industry Portfolio - equal-weighted 171.7 0.95 0.46
Biotech Industry Portfolio - value-weighted 174.5 0.94 0.45
S&P500 122.6 1.16 0.56
Nasdaq composite - EW 90.4 1.35 0.65
Nasdaq composite - VW 117.9 1.18 0.57
NYSE/AMEX - VW 89.4 1.36 0.66
NYSE/AMEX - EW 108.1 1.24 0.60
Avg 5-Year Buy-and-Hold Return
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Table III. The Long-Run Performance of IPOs by Cohort Year. 
The sample consists of 842 initial public offerings (633 from 1980 to 1997) by firms subsequently listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (Amex), the NASDAQ.  Each cohort year 
portfolio includes all returns up to five years of biotechnology firms which went public in that given year.  The 
Benchmark is representative of a portfolio of the biotechnology population returns, excluding IPO returns within 
five years of the initial CRSP listing date.  Once again, the benchmark buy-and-hold return is the five year buy-and-
hold return of the benchmark portfolio purchased in that cohort year.  The wealth relative in each cohort year is 
[(1+Rp) / (1+ Rbench)].  Rp is the five year buy-and-hold percentage return of a portfolio which contains the returns up 
to 5-years of all firms which performed an IPO in that given year.  Rbench is the five year buy-and-hold return of the 
biotechnology portfolio that excludes all IPO returns within five years of the initial CRSP listing date.  For example, 










1980 6 88.66       186.70     0.66 74.76       88.57       0.93
1981 9 405.90     194.68     1.72 18.02       122.59     0.53
1982 14 28.64       245.21     0.37 3.84         198.17     0.35
1983 29 (48.48)      137.23     0.22 (61.60)      158.08     0.15
1984 10 19.94       142.39     0.49 (37.18)      165.72     0.24
1985 13 77.89       165.12     0.67 24.16       258.43     0.35
1986 74 734.52     77.99       4.69 271.29     185.09     1.30
1987 25 59.41       239.51     0.47 6.64         230.64     0.32
1988 13 (48.14)      259.24     0.14 (61.37)      153.38     0.15
1989 67 14.85       212.38     0.37 (62.48)      105.17     0.18
1990 23 151.67     117.59     1.16 (3.30)        58.91       0.61
1991 58 190.45     265.17     0.80 2.78         116.50     0.47
1992 46 60.11       72.29       0.93 12.45       64.23       0.68
1993 46 360.55     66.58       2.76 60.06       185.95     0.56
1994 39 222.08     49.89       2.15 196.96     367.22     0.64
1995 40 268.17     220.38     1.15 (7.28)        295.51     0.23
1996 73 172.21     207.62     0.88 0.10         244.65     0.29
1997 48 80.96       231.31     0.55 1.04         142.75     0.42
1998* 32 49.44       98.89       0.75 (0.42)        26.04       0.79
1999* 38 17.69       106.46     0.57 3.63         (15.59)      1.23
2000* 92 (49.95)      25.81       0.40 4.74         (10.61)      1.17
2001* 30 (26.21)      (18.66)      0.91 (0.58)        (35.37)      1.54
2002* 17 11.53       (38.03)      1.80 12.21       (24.80)      1.49
1980-2002** 633 $ 78.21 $ 66.66 $ 37.09 $ 37.97
Mean Buy-and-Hold 
Returns (%)
Value Weighted Portfolio - 5 Year 
Buy-and-Hold Return
Equally Weighted Portfolio - 5 Year 
Buy-and-Hold Return
* The return window for these cohorts is truncated at December 31, 2002.
** If one were to invest $1 and hold the IPO portfolio for the 22 year period from Jan-1980 to Dec-
2002, this is the dollar amount of the portfolio at Dec 2002.  The IPO portfolio includes IPO firms' 
returns up to 5 years after the initial CRSP listing date.
Mean Buy-and-Hold 
Returns (%)
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 Table IV. Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Regression on Full Sample Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) Portfolios 
 
The sample is all IPOs from 1980 to 2002.  The universe is CRSP-listed New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
American Stock Exchange (Amex), and Nasdaq firms which are within the biotechnology industry portfolio, as 
defined by SIC codes 2830-2836 and 8730 and 8734.  Portfolios of IPOs include all issues that were performed 
within the previous five years.  Rm,t is the return on the value–weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks 
in month t; Rf,t is the beginning-of-month one-month Treasury Bill rate in month t; SMBt is the return on small firms 
minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market (value) stocks minus low 
book-to-market (growth) stocks in month t. 
 
a, Intercept b, MKTRF s, SMB h, HML R2, adj
(1) Issuers 0.01059 0.99610 1.61309 -0.41467 0.53531
(3.07) (11.31) (14.68) (-3.20)
(2) Non-issuers, Benchmark 0.00914 0.88842 1.19632 -0.30430 0.71620
(3.38) (12.87) (13.89) (-3.00)
(3) Excess Return 0.00145 0.10767 0.41678 -0.11037 0.14826
(1) - (2) (0.56) (1.62) (5.02) (-1.13)
(4) Issuers 0.00632 0.97177 0.63499 -0.28745 0.53531
(1.84) (11.08) (5.80) (-2.23)
(5) Non-issuers, Benchmark 0.00655 0.76200 -0.40392 -0.20772 0.53957
(2.94) (13.40) (-5.69) (-2.48)
(6) Excess Return -0.00023 0.20978 1.03891 -0.07973 0.39188
(4) - (5) (-0.07) (2.71) (10.76) (-0.70)
Coefficient Estimates
Panel A.  Equally-Weighted Portfolio Returns
Rp,t –Rf,t = a + b[Rm,t – Rf,t] + sSMBt + hHMLt + et
Panel B.  Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns
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Table V. Time-series Regressions of Equally Weighted and Value-Weighted Monthly 
Percentage Returns on the Fama French three-factors for Portfolios of Large and Small 
Firms. 
 
The universe is CRSP-listed New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and Nasdaq 
firms which are within the biotechnology industry portfolio, as defined by SIC codes 2830-2836 and 8730 and 8734.  
Large firms are those whose market capitalization at the end of the month t is greater than the sample’s median 
market cap at the end of the same time period.  Likewise, small firms are those with market capitalizations smaller 
htan the sample’s median market cap.  Rm,t is the return on the value–weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq 
stocks in month t; Rf,t is the beginning-of-month one-month Treasury Bill rate in month t; SMBt is the return on 
small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market (value) stocks 
minus low book-to-market (growth) stocks in month t.  The dependent variable in regressions (3), (6), (9), and (12) 
is the difference in returns between issuing and non-issuing portfolios.  t-Statistics are in parentheses beneath each 
coefficient. 
 
a, Intercept b, MKTRF s, SMB h, HML R2, adj
(1) Large Issuers 0.02674 1.04603 1.56299 -0.57942 0.66492
(6.49) (10.08) (11.91) (-3.70)
(2) Large Non-issuers 0.01887 0.92813 1.07544 -0.44743 0.68165
(6.08) (11.87) (10.87) (-3.79)
(3) Excess Return 0.00787 0.11790 0.48755 -0.13199 0.17263
(1) - (2) (2.74) (1.63) (5.33) (-1.21)
(4) Small Issuers -0.00300 0.96546 1.59565 -0.23405 0.62588
(-0.78) (9.79) (12.96) (-1.61)
(5) Small Non-issuers -0.00473 0.81335 1.47027 -0.13792 0.55479
(-1.22) (8.21) (11.88) (-0.95)
(6) Excess Return 0.00173 0.15211 0.12538 -0.09613 0.03231
(4) - (5) (0.52) (1.81) (1.19) (-0.78)
(7) Large Issuers 0.00674 0.14613 -0.08076 -0.12519 0.00400
(1.41) (1.20) (-0.53) (-0.70)
(8) Large Non-issuers 0.00680 0.76114 -0.41487 -0.20755 0.53835
(3.02) (13.23) (-5.80) (-2.46)
(9) Excess Return -0.00006 -0.61501 0.33411 0.08236 0.10368
(8) - (9) (-0.01) (-4.55) (1.99) (0.42)
(10) Small Issuers -0.02126 1.03784 1.56566 -0.14015 0.61938
(-5.45) (10.42) (12.61) (-0.96)
(11) Small Non-issuers -0.02236 0.84328 1.42073 -0.15509 0.56888
(-5.92) (8.75) (11.81) (-1.09)
(12) Excess Return 0.00111 0.19456 0.14493 0.01494 0.02697
(11) - (12) (0.37) (2.31) (1.37) (0.17)
Coefficient Estimates
Panel A.  Equally-Weighted Portfolio Returns
Rp,t –Rf,t = a + b[Rm,t – Rf,t] + sSMBt + hHMLt + et
Panel B.  Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns
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Figure I. Individual IPO Firms’ Buy-and-Hold Returns 
This bar and line graph charts Table I data.  All specifics and assumption denoted for Table I apply here.  The left y-
axis denotes the number of firms which fall within each percentage return value.  The right y-axis provides the 
cumulative percentage of firms that have returns that fall below the particular percentage return.  The x-axis presents 
the return on holding the particular individual IPO stock for five years or the last CRSP listing date. 
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Figure II. IPO Long-Run Performance and Volume by Cohort Year. 
This bar and line graph charts Table III’s data.  All specifics and assumption denoted for Table III apply here.  The 
left y-axis denotes the volume of firms that performed an IPO during that cohort year.  The right y-axis provides the 
wealth relative ratio between the cohort IPO portfolio and biotechnology industry portfolio.  The x-axis supplies the 
cohort year of firms that performed an IPO between 1980 and 1997.   
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